The history of mathematics is essentially different from the history of other sciences in its relationship with the history of science, because it never was an integral part of the latter in the Whewellian sense. The reason for this is obvious: mathematics being far more esoteric than the other sciences, its history can only be told to a select group of initiates. It is true that there are in every science certain questions which are more difficult to explain than others, or cannot be explained without long preliminaries, but those questions are almost exclusively recent ones; in the case of mathematics, on the contrary, the difficulties began very early. There are problems which exercised the minds of men in the fifth century B.C. and cannot be entirely explained to the nonmathematicians of today, and it is impossible to make the latter realize the grandeur and beauty of Greek mathematics.
One might thus oppose the history of mathematics to the history of science, and this is often done for practical reasons. The teacher of the history of science being obliged to omit mathematical questions-especially the most interesting ones-, because only a part of his audience could be expected to understand them, it is natural enough to organize separate courses devoted to the history of mathematics. There are then at least two courses (or two series of courses) completing one another, the history of science and the history of mathematics.
It is a pity that this should be so, for the history of mathematics should really be the kernel of the history of culture. Take the mathematical developments out of the history of science, and you suppress the skeleton which supported and kept together all the rest. Mathematics gives to science its innermost unity and cohesion, which can never be entirely replaced with props and buttresses or with roundabout connections, no matter how many of these may be introduced.
On the other hand, the historian of mathematics, remembering that his activity is complementary to that of the historian of science, will not attempt to do over agin the latter's task, and he may even feel inclined to take of his own subject too technical and too narrow a view. Therefore, it is well to insist that he should seize every occasion to indicate the relationships between mathematics and other sciences, and to insist that these relationships have always been reciprocal: mathematical problems being often the result of physical needs, while mathematical elaboration gave physics, and, gradually, other sciences, not only means of discovery of almost miraculous potency, but also perfect models of analysis and synthesis.
Some historians of mathematics, with a strong bent for humanism, are willing to consider not only other scientific activities than the purely mathematical, but the whole gamut of life. So much the better. Others, moving in the opposite direction, feel that the history of mathematics itself-not to speak of the history of science-is too complicated a subject, and, wishing to avoid the endless intricacies of the mathematical tree, they select one branch of it, and study its development in more or less complete isolation from the others. Thus the historian may be led to investigate the development of algebra across the ages, or the amplifications of a single idea, like the idea of number, function, or group. Such abstraction in historical research, as opposed to the more natural procedure of considering each fact as it occurs in due chronological order, is very arbitrary. It is perhaps worth while to examine the matter a little more carefully. The filiation of ideas is somewhat like the filiation of individuals, except that the intricacy is even greater. Any individual A thinking only of his own genealogy has a simple pattern in his mind like our figure I, but that pattern is obviously a false one, from every point of view except that of his own unimportant personality. In reality, the pattern is enormously more complicated, for each couple may have had more than one child, each person may have married more than once, and marriages between cousins have introduced new cross-relationships. The complete picture of a man's family is like a network which, if it be drawn completely even for only a few generations, is almost inextricable. Of course there is nothing to prevent any individual from selecting in that network and drawing more heavily the lines which concern him immediately, the blood-lines, but the personal pattern thus abstracted from the whole network is of no interest except to himself. Now the filiation of ideas is necessarily more complicated, for the biological pattern is rigorously limited by the rule that each individual has two parents, neither more nor less, while each idea may result from the fusion of more than two others, or on the contrary may be the fruit of a kind of parthenogenesis. Whenever the historian tries to relate the history of a single group of ideas he is obliged to abstract one pattern from a network of endless complexity, and such an abstraction, however interesting it may be, is always arbitrary to a degree.
The study of special branches of mathematics or of special mathematical ideas is very useful, for it helps one to understand those particular ideas more deeply, but it should not be allowed to confuse our historical perspective. The historian must try to keep in mind the chronological succession not of this or that idea, abstracted from the rest, but of the main ideas, all of them in their mutual relationships and in their diverse connections with the rest of life. *** Many times have I compared the history of science with a secret history, the account of a development taking place mysteriously in the darkness, while the majority of people are more interested and more immediately affected by the events happening on the battlefield or the forum, or by the vicissitudes of their own selves and families. For societies, even as for individuals, one must make a sharp distinction between the things which are the most urgent and those which are the most important. These things are not by any means the same. The most urgent necessity is to live, to remain alive, that is, to eat, sleep, to be happy, to procreate children, and obtain security for one's family. That means physiology, business, and sport, and often enough war. However, the most important things are not to satisfy one's physiological needs, but to increase the cultural heritage which has been bequeathed to us. The urgent things are obvious enough, and men's efforts to obtain them fill the whole historical picture; one can hardly see anything else. Yet all the time some men pursue in the darkness, secretly, the fulfilment of their intellectual desires and of humanity's highest purpose.
If the history of science is a secret history, then the history of mathematics is doubly secret, a secret within a secret, for the growth of mathematics is unknown not only to the general public, but even to scientific workers. It is true, engineers may be found from time to time employing a new formula, but this does not imply any knowledge or understanding of the process which led to it. Even so the average citizen uses every day more and more complicated and marvelous machines about which he knows less and less.
Yet that secret activity is fundamental; it is all the time creating new theories, which sooner or later will set new wheels moving, new machines working, or, better still, will enable us to obtain a deeper understanding of the mechanism of the universe.
The practical man may neglect those secreta secretorum, but the philosopher cannot neglect them without loss and without disgrace. The 'practical' and hard-headed mathematician, bent on his own investigations and nothing else, may neglect them too, but he will be a poorer man for doing so. Indeed, one may claim that the history of mathematics provides for him the very best education, the best humanistic initiation, one especially adapted to his own needs.
Let us contemplate for a moment the magnificent panorama of mathematical history as it unfolds itself before us when we evoke the past. First, millenaries of preparation during which some fundamental discoveries are already adumbrated: the idea of number slowly emerges from the darkness, the idea of fraction, the idea of periodicity in geometrical patterns, and others. By the middle of the fourth millennium before Christ, the Egyptians were already acquainted with large numbers of the order of millions, and with a decimal system of numeration. Before the middle of the second millennium they had already attained sufficient geometrical insight to determine the area of any triangle as we do it ourselves, and to solve more difficult problems, such as finding the volume of a frustum of a square pyramid. To measure the area of a circle they squared eight-ninths of its diameter, which was a remarkably good approximation. During all that time the people of Mesopotamia had been developing a mathematics of their own which was as admirable as the Egyptian. In the fourth millennium the Sumerians had already some kind of 'position' concept in the writing of numbers, and had learned to treat submultiples in the same way as multiplies, an idea which the Western world did not recapture until fifty centuries later. The geometry of the Babylonians did not reach the same level as that of the Egyptians, but on the other hand their resourcefulness in algebra was astounding, for they succeeded in solving not only quadratic but even cubic equations. To appreciate the relative importance of these achievements it is well to remember that we are much closer to Euclid, often called 'the father of geometry,' than Euclid was to the unknown Egyptian and Mesopotamian mathematicians.
In reality the way for Euclidean mathematics was very gradually and thoroughly prepared, not only by the millenary efforts of Africans and Asiatics, but by three centuries of persistent investigations by the most gifted people among our ancestors, the Greeks of the golden age. The historian is made to witness the building up, as it were stone by stone, of that wonderful monument, geometry, as it was finally transmitted to us in the Elements. The Greek 'miracle' continued for at least six more centuries after Euclid, but with less and less intensity and with longer intervals of sleep between the periods of creation. In the meanwhile, the centre of mathematical light had moved from Athens for a brief interval to Syracuse and then to the Greco-oriental city of Alexandria, where it remained for centuries. Thus was their debt to Egypt abundantly repaid by the Greek masters and the Roman disciples.
After the Romans come the barbarians, and ancient wisdom was in danger of complete oblivion, when it was unexpectedly rescued by the Arabs. These were also barbarians, but barbarians redeemed by an intense faith and, for a few centuries at least, by an unquenchable curiosity. The masterpieces of Greek mathematics were translated into Arabic and thus transmitted to the West. If we call the Greek astounding rationalization of geometrical thought a miracle (by means of which word we simply mean to convey that we cannot account for the achievement but only marvel at it), then the Arabic rescue and renaissance was another miracle, that is, a series of events which nobody could have foreseen and which nobody can completely explain.
The Arabs were mainly transmitters and brokers, but their brokerage in a period of crisis was almost providential. They brought together Hindu and Greek ideas, fertilizing the ones with the others, and revolutionizing arithmetic, algebra, and trigonometry. Their own contributions in these branches of mathematics were considerable, and in geometry they were sufficiently good pupils of the Greeks to discuss the postulates of Euclid and solve the most difficult problems of Archimedean and Apollonian geometry at a time when Latin knowledge had sunk below the Egyptian or the Babylonian level. After five centuries of leadership the Arabic culture succumbed under the stress of political vicissitudes and Muslim obscurantism, and a new renaissance of mathematics began in Western Europe.
That Renaissance, slowly prepared by Christian and Jewish mathematicians, blossomed first, as we should expect, in Italy, then in the Netherlands, England, and the other countries of Europe, where trade was flourishing and new cities rapidly growing, where universities vied with one another, and emulation was excited by proud challenges from some of the mathematicians to their rivals. Thus was gradually introduced a second golden age almost as brilliant as the first. Just think of this array of men, the children of a single century: Kepler, Napier, Briggs, Fermat, Descartes, Desargues, Pascal, Huygens, Newton, Leibniz, Seki Kōwa. What could we say of those giants in so brief a sketch as this, except that the glory of Greece, so well known to all of them (except the last), was resurrected in them? In a way they continued the Greek tradition, and they did it with so much fervour that they almost forgot their humbler but very real debts to the Middle Ages. This golden age was not transitory, like the Greek one; it continued, with less splendor perhaps but with equal greatness, until our own days. The immense prestige of the seventeenth-century mathematics is partly due to the effect of contrast. The giants of those golden days seem more gigantic because they rose so near the mediaeval plains. We are startled when we think of the close succession of their achievements, and the cumulative effect upon us is similar to that of the mountains which we see in the course of a journey. As we come from the lowlands, the first snowy peak amazes us, and if many such giants of nature follow each other within a relatively short time we may be completely overwhelmed. There were a number of mathematical giants in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but by that time a new pace had already been set, and one almost expected mathematical progress to continue indefinitely as the same rate.
Will it continue? It is too early to know, but the twentieth century has strongly accentuated the spirit of criticism which characterized the end of the last century, and created in mathematics, as well as in other fields of science, a period of examination, experimentation (yes, even in mathematics), 2 and revolutionary thought, which may be the best preparation for new adventures and new discoveries. We cannot tell what will happen, because such fermentation of mathematical ideas has not occurred before on the same scale: It may be a good omen, or the outcome may be smaller than the bustle. Let us remember the secrecy of mathematics. Great discoveries are not made without preparation, far from it, but they are likely to come in very quietly, without drums and trumpets.
One thing is certain, the climax of the seventeenth century and that of to-day are not the last ones, though young men may sometimes feel discouraged and think that all the worth-while discoveries have already been made and that nothing remains to be found but odd gleanings. Such a feeling is sometimes induced by the very necessities of their mathematical education. Indeed, dogmatic teaching, even at its best, tends to create an impression of finality which is more satisfying than stimulating. It should appease those young students to realize that such feeling is not by any means new, but has occurred time after time, whenever the intellectual horizon had been suddenly broadened by men of genius. At such times there has been a tendency to see in the latest broadening the final revelation. I am sure some of the old Egyptians of fifty centuries ago felt that way in their moments of despondency: the best had been done, and further progress would become increasingly difficult, if not impossible.
Consider the following example, which is a little closer to us. In the report on mathematical progress prepared for the French Academy of Sciences at Napoleon's request, Delambre remarked:
It would be difficult and perhaps foolhardy to analyze the chances of further progress; in almost every part of mathematics one is stopped by unsurmountable difficulties; improvements in the details seem to be the only possibilities which are left. … All these difficulties seem to announce that the power of our analysis is almost exhausted, even as the power of ordinary algebra with regard to transcendental geometry in the time of Leibniz and Newton, and that there is a need of combinations opening a new field to the calculation of transcendental quantities and to the solution of the equations including them.
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One cannot help smiling when one bears in mind the phenomenal mathematical progress which has taken place since 1810, when Delambre made that statement. To be sure Delambre was careful in qualifying it: no progress is conceivable unless new combinations are found; but not only were new combinations found, the old ones were far from being used up. Have we not witnessed in recent times an astounding revival of elementary geometry, the new geometry of the triangle and the tetrahedron, the circle and the sphere? And yet, such is the incorrigibleness of human nature, a mathematician who has distinguished himself in that very field, Julian Coolidge, has just indulged his own pessimism in a lecture on the rise and fall of projective geometry. 4 If theorems which Euclid might have discovered were not discovered until twenty-two centuries later, may we not assume that Steiner, von Staudt, and their disciples have overlooked more things than we can imagine?
The history of mathematics is exhilarating, because it unfolds before us the vision of an endless series of victories of the human mind, victories without counterbalancing failures, that is, without dishonorable and humiliating ones, and without atrocities. At the same time it helps to dispel pessimism. However great victories may be, the seasoned historian expects still more and greater ones. Has it not always been so? Has not each mathematical conquest been followed with another and nobler one? History shows that time after time a theory which was thought final and complete was nothing but a stepping stone to a better one, and new theories were thus established one after another when there seemed to be no more room for them. Why should the future be essentially different from the past? Why should our presence to-day create such a strange discontinuity in human evolution? It is thus highly probable that mathematicians will continue to be unfolded with greater and greater exuberance. There may be now and then periods of rest and fallow, but it is almost inconceivable that our knowledge should ever be everywhere lost and permanently stopped. It cannot decrease, it is bound to increase, though no one can foretell the rate of growth.
The process of growing abstraction, diversity, and complexity which began in prehistoric days when the idea of number was adumbrated, and which has never since been completely checked, will continue. There is no reason why it should not. The mathematical field has been enormously enlarged, it is true, but the larger the field, the greater, not smaller, are the opportunities; the longer the frontiers of science, the more space there is for new departures into the unknown. On the basis of my historical experience, I fully believe that mathematics of the twenty-fifth century will be as different from that of to-day as the latter is from that of the sixteenth century.
In the meanwhile, our intellectual wealth is becoming truly embarrassing. The mathematical universe is already so large and diversified that it is hardly possible for a single mind to grasp it, or, to put it in another way, so much energy would be needed for grasping it that there would be none left for creative research. A mathematical congress of to-day reminds one of the Tower of Babel, for few men can follow profitably the discussions of sections other than their own, and even there they are sometimes made to feel like strangers. In consequence, the explorer and the conqueror are condemned to relative ignorance and blindness, and they become less and less able to complete their task without guidance from others. This illustrates in another way the increasing need of mathematical surveys, historical analyses, philosophical elaborations. *** No thinking man can contemplate the mathematical past without asking himself some fundamental questions, which are as simple to formulate as they are difficult to answer. To what extent were the filiation and development of ideas determined either by outside circumstances or by a kind of internal necessity? An extreme answer to that question was suggested by Évariste Galois:
La science progresse par une série de combinaisons où le hazard ne jour pas le moindre rôle; sa vie est brute et ressemble à celle des miné-raux qui croissent par juxtà position. Celà s'applique non seulement à la science telle qu'elle résulte des travaux d'une série de savants, mais aussi aux recherches particulières à chacun d'eux. En vain les analystes voudraient-ils se le dissimuler: ile ne déduisent pas, ils combinent, ils comparent; quand ils arrivent à la vérité, c'est en heurtant de côté et d'autre qu'il y sont tombés.
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There is no doubt that Galois's curious answer was itself dominated by an internal necessity, by the merciless genius in him which left him no choice but to obey. He must have felt strongly the hopelessness of resisting one's fate. As to external necessities, very clear answers on the subject have been given us repeatedly by mathematicians of the new Russian persuasion. According to them, even Newton's achievement was conditioned by the economic needs of his time. And yet I am not convinced. It is easy enough to explain some facts retrospectively, especially if one be free to select the convenient facts and to abandon the inconvenient ones. Why did the most industrial and mercantile nation of Europe reject the metric system, while its use would have caused great economies in time and money? Suppose the situation had been reversed, how tempting it would have been to explain the creation of the metric system as a necessary result of the superior mercantilism of England.
There is no doubt that mathematical discoveries are conditioned by outside events of every kind, political, economic, scientific, military, and by the incessant demands of the arts of peace and war. Mathematics did never develop in a political or economic vacuum. However, we think that those events were only some of the factors among others, factors the power of which might vary and did vary from time to time. It might be almost decisive in one case, and ineffectual in another.
Even the internal necessity, though much stronger than the external one, might be inoperative. While the properties of ellipses were revealed in the second half of the third century B.C. by the genius of Apollonios, astronomers continued for more than eighteen centuries to account for the erratic motions of the planets by complicated systems of epicycles and eccentrics. Granted that the problem of finding the earth's trajectory was exceedingly difficult, 6 Kepler's achievements might have occurred much earlier. One would have thought that the concept of the ellipse would have been strong enough to impose itself on men's minds and to find for itself beautiful applications.
The historian is unable to dictate how things will happen or should happen; he must be satisfied to describe humbly enough how they did happen. He naturally tries to arrange events in causal sequences, but he should never indulge in dogmatism on the subject.
The main sources of mathematical invention seem to be within man rather than outside of him: his own inveterate and insatiable curiosity, his constant itching for intellectual adventure; and likewise the main obstacles to mathematical progress seem to be also within himself; his scandalous inertia and laziness, his fear of adventure, his need of conformity to old standards, and his obsession by mathematical ghosts. It is true these ghosts may sometimes suggest valuable applications and survive. For example, the shadow of the unitary fractions of the Egyptians influenced mathematics for centuries and impeded its progress, but they suggested incidentally the fractions in gradibus of Leonardo Fibonacci (1202) and the continued fractions of later times. 7 Our mathematical practice of to-day is still littered with the fossils of earlier times, such as Roman numerals, sexagesimal fractions, the English weights and measures, etc.; on the other hand, other relics have been abandoned, the rediscovery of which delights the historian, even as obsolete curios delight the archaeologist. When we compare the whole of mankind with a single man growing in knowledge and wisdom, we may stretch the comparison a little further: no man remembers equally well everything; even the best memory experiences lapses, betrayals, and preferences. The whole of mankind is like a man with a memory that is good but not perfect. The deterministic theory of mathematical progress remains insufficient even when one has corrected and tempered it as we have done. It is not always possible to account for the development of mathematical ideas by a combination of external events with personal impulses on the one hand and personal inhibitions on the other, great as is the flexibility of such a method. There are many facts which one cannot account for in a general way, and this applies to mathematical inventions as well as to any other details of human behavior. Many mathematical developments are capricious in the extreme, and it is a waste of time to try to find a rational explanation of them. Strangely enough, in the same text wherein Galois expressed so strongly his belief in mathematical fatality, he also called attention to the great irregularity and disorder of our mathematical knowledge. An orderly development would only be possible for a godlike mathematician knowing in advance all the possible mathematics.
Here is really the crux of the matter. Mathematicians and other scientists, however great they may be, do not know the future. Their genius may enable them to project their purpose ahead of them; it is as if they had a special lamp, unavailable to lesser men, illuminating their path; but even in the most favorable cases the lamp sends only a very small cone of light into the infinite darkness. Enthusiastic admirers of great men often make the mistake of giving them credit for the endless consequences of their discoveries, consequences which they could not possibly foresee. To credit Galois with all the results of the theory of groups is as foolish as to credit Faraday with all the wonders of electrotechnics, or to hold Columbus responsible for all the good and evil done in the New World since 1492. The founder of a new theory or of a new science deserves full credit for the discoveries which he actually made, less credit for those which he adumbrated, and still less for those which he made possible but did not realize. While we honor him as a founder, we must remember that he could not possibly anticipate all the consequences of his ideas and all the fruits of his deeds. He is the spiritual lord of the domain which his imagination could encompass, neither more nor less. We often call him the father of this or that, and such a term is appropriate enough to express our respect, even our veneration, if we bear in mind that parents should not be praised or blamed too much for their children, though they made them, not to speak of their more distant descendants who sprang from other loins.
The capriciousness of mathematical development cannot be emphasized too much. Why were the early Greeks so interested in the theory of numbers, and so little in plain arithmetic? The latter was highly needed. Every reason of economic necessity should have caused the development of arithmetic, and discouraged as a luxury the growth of fanciful ideas on the properties of numbers. Why did magic squares interest so many peoples East and West? Why? Why? The student of history should not ask such childish queries. His purpose cannot be to give a completely logical account of the past, for such account is obviously out of the question. It is only here and there that a few logical knots can be tied; for the rest, we must be satisfied with a faithful description of the possibilities which materialized among an infinity of others which did not. The shortest distance from one point to another is a geodetic line, but such a line can only be followed if one knows one's destination, in which case there would be no discovery. The ways of discovery must necessarily be very different from the shortest way, indirect and circuitous, with many windings and retreats. It is only at a later stage of knowledge, when a new domain has been sufficiently explored, that it becomes possible to reconstruct the whole theory on a logical basis, and to show how it might have been discovered by an omniscient being, that is, how it might have been discovered if there had been no real need of discovering it! Galois's impatience with the textbooks of his day was inconsistent. It is as if an explorer of an unknown territory complained of the absence of maps, or the student of an unknown language of the lack of grammars and dictionaries.
To conclude, capriciousness is of the essence of discovery, because we can only know where we are going, and whether it is worth going to, when we are there. Accordingly we cannot help following many false trails, and going astray in many ways. Moreover, caprice is of the essence of life in general, and of human life in particular, because of life's very complexity and indetermination. *** Nevertheless, the development of mathematics is perhaps less capricious than that of other sciences, more completely determined (or less determined), if not by external factors, at least by internal ones, for each theory presses forward as it were, and the mathematicians who are playing with it must needs perceive some of its consequences. The desire to follow them to the limit is then likely to prove irresistible, whether these consequences be useful or not. The concatenations of mathematical ideas are not divorced from life, far from it, but they are less influenced than other scientific ideas by accidents, and it is perhaps more possible, and more permissible, for a mathematician than for any other man to secrete himself in a tower of ivory.
***
The history of mathematics is thus a good field for the investigation of theories concerning the progress of science in general, and the possibilities of logical development in particular. It is conceivable that the capriciousness is only relative after all, that it affects the details of the picture rather than the main outline. Such a conception is attractive enough to be fully investigated, and only the historian can do it. The vicissitudes of history might be overlooked in a first approximation. One might assume that Man (not this man or that, whatever be his genius) followed unerringly the geodetic line from A to B (A and B being two mathematical discoveries) instead of meandering and beating about the bush ( fig. 2 ).
This assumption, in fact, the historian of mathematics is often obliged to make, if only for the sake of brevity and simplicity. Reality is far too complex to be represented to the last detail, but the historian's simplification must remain sufficiently close to it; it must represent the main outline in chronological sequence. It is thus exceedingly different from the synthetic reconstruction made by teachers, wherein the chronological sequence is necessarily disregarded as irrelevant. The mathematician whose privilege it is to give to a theory its final, 'classical' shape, is likely to define the function he is dealing with by means of the property which was perhaps the last one to be discovered. That is all right: the synthesis thus created, however distant it may be from historical contingencies, is closer to the deeper mathematical realities.
We need equally the two kinds of synthesis: the historical and the purely mathematical. The latter is the shortest if not always the easiest path to knowledge, but it fails to explain the human implications; it may satisfy the matter-of-fact and hurried mathematician; it cannot satisfy the philosopher and the humanist.
As to the pure mathematician, even he should not be too easily satisfied with the latest synthesis. To begin with, that synthesis may be incomplete. Some elements which were not deemed essential for it may have other values, they may prove to be essential for other structures, or the one from which they were eliminated may not be as final as it seems. Indeed, no theory is ever final. A new discovery, a new point of view may cause its abandonment and its supersedure by another, and the facts neglected in one shuffling may be considered invaluable in another. Every synthesis implies sacrifices; it is not merely a simplification but also and unavoidably a betrayal of reality, a distortion of the truth, and the mathematician who takes the trouble of considering the origin and evolution of ideas, as well as their final shape, will improve his understanding of them and enrich his mind.
The study of history may, or may not, help the mathematician to make new discoveries by suggesting new connections between old ideas or new applications of old methods; in any case it will complete his mastery of the subject, and provide him with new opportunities for a deeper and more intuitive grasp of it. *** The main reason for studying the history of mathematics, or the history of any science, is purely humanistic. Being men, we are interested in other men, and especially in such men as have helped us to fulfil our highest destiny. As soon as we realize the great part played by individual men in mathematical discoveries-for, however these may be determined, they cannot be brought about except by means of human brains-, we are anxious to know all their circumstances 8 How did it happen that this man or that man among others, was devoted to mathematics? Was he thus consecrated before being conscious of it, or did he consecrate himself? How did his mathematical genius assert itself, how did it blossom out? Was it hard for him or easy? Did he succeed in establishing his theories and convincing his contemporaries of their importance? All these questions and many others are deeply interesting, especially for other mathematicians: if they are young, because of their dreams of the future and their hopes and doubts; if they are older, because of their memories of the past, and also, though in a different way, because of their hopes and doubts.
One soon realizes that mathematicians are much like other men, except in the single respect of their special genius, and that genius itself has many shapes and aspects. I remember reading in John Addington Symonds's biography this portrait of a great musician:
Here was a man Handel, a fat native of Halle, in the Duchy of Magdeburg, articled at eight years old to an organist, and from that moment given up to music-a man who never loved a woman, who (to use the words of his enthusiastic biographer) continued irritable, greedy, fond of solitude, persevering, unaffectionate, coarse and garrulous in conversation, benevolent, independent, fond of beer, religious, without passions, and without a single intellectual taste. He had never received any education except in counterpoint. He had had no experience. Yet he could interpret the deepest psychological secrets; he could sing dithyrambs to God, or preach moral sermons; he could express the feelings of mighty nations, and speak with the voice of angels more effectually than even Milton; he could give life to passion, and in a few changes of his melody lead love through all its variations from despair to triumph-there was nothing that he did not know. The whole world had become for him music, and his chords were co-extensive with the universe. Raphael's capability to paint the school of Athens, after coming from the workshop of Perugino, was perhaps less marvelous than Handel's to delineate the length and breadth and height and depth of human nature in his choruses. We shall never comprehend, nous 8 Such inquisitiveness may seem idle to those relatively few men who are too engrossed in their own thoughts to care for anything else, but it represents one of the oldest human instincts. The same instinct reveals itself on a lower level through the immense curiosity concerning murders. Newspapers are skillful in pandering to such curiosity to their own profit. Even as the mass of the people are insatiable in their desire to know every detail of a murder case, so those who are more thoughtful wish to investigate every detail of scientific discoveries or other creative achievements.
autres, the mysteries of genius. It is a God-sent clairvoyance, inexplicable, and different in kind from intellect.
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This account has recurred to me almost every time I have been introduced to an original scientist, for it applies to him as well as to his musical brethren.
The great mathematician may be a man of very limited experience and wisdom outside his own field and his advice in non-mathematical matters may be of very little value; he may be burdened with all kinds of passions and weaknesses; in short, he is like the rest of except in one essential respect. When we write his biography it is clear that it is that essential thing, his genius, which must remain in the centre of the picture, but our curiosity does not stop there. We may be so deeply interested in his personality that we desire to know everything, whether good or bad, which concerns it. That is all right. Full and honest biographies should be encouraged by all means, they help us to know our fellow men and ourselves better, but that loathsome fashion of our time, which is called 'debunking'-the dragging down of great men to the level of their meretricious biographers-should be discouraged. It is a matter of measure. It is very well to show all the weaknesses of a hero, but this should be subordinated to the main purpose, the description of his genius, the explanation of the discoveries which it made possible, the contemplation of the truth and beauty which it revealed.
For example, a great mathematician may be a drunkard, for his mind's obsession with mathematical ideas may sometimes become unendurable, a real torture from which he may wish to escape. Drink may provide a welcome relief; if in addition his will be feeble-and there is no reason why genius should always be associated with a will strong enough to cope with it-, and if he be afflicted with sorrows, he may become an habitual tippler and disgrace himself accordingly. Such facts should not be hidden by the biographer, but they should not be unduly magnified by him. Our hero does not become more 'human' and more lovable because he is shown to be a drunkard, though we may feel much sympathy for him in his troubles; and, of course, his genius is not at all explained by his drunkenness. Such a detail, we should remember, is interesting, but only in its proper place, the dim background; to insist upon it or to focus the picture upon it is a cruel distortion of the truth. Everybody can get drunk, but the number of mathematicians is small, and the number of creative mathematicians exceedingly small It is easy enough to cause physical intoxication, but there is no known method for producing that kind of sacred intoxication out of which discoveries bubble.
Mediocre people will perhaps assert that it is now too late for discoveries, that all those of any value have already been made. I have already disposed of this fallacy. It is safer to assume, as a first approximation, that mathematical progress is a function of the size of the mathematical field and of the length of the mathematical frontiers. However it is arguable that the number of great mathematicians does not increase very much from time to time, or does not continue to increase as much as one might expect. It is quite certain that the number of original mathematicians has not increased in proportion to the number of well trained mathematicians, or to the availabilities for mathematical research. This confirms my theory that mathematical theory is not very much determined by external circumstances. The main factor is the availability of creative genius, which cannot be controlled.
In the experimental sciences, discoveries may become possible or be facilitated by the use of new instruments, and in certain cases it is difficult to separate the virtues of the instrument from those of the observer. In mathematics, as in music, genius can be contemplated in a greater state of purity, and hence the history of mathematics is perhaps more interesting to the psychologist than that of any other science. *** To the educated and intelligent mathematician, or at least to the one whose curiosity and intelligence extent beyond the boundaries of his special studies, the history of mathematics affords a recreation which is pleasant as well as instructive. It requires from him no great effort, but he should always remember with gratitude that his enjoyment is made possible by the devotion of a few scholars for whom this is not a pure recreation but a vocation as imperative and tyrannical as his own. Above all, he should bear in mind that history has no value unless it be accurate, or as accurate as possible, and that such accuracy is as difficult to obtain and to increase in this field as in any other. He should insist on being given for his recreation the best and purest kind of history, and not be satisfied with the second best or the imperfect; he should reject without hesitation the books wherein the sober truth is replaced by flippancy and jesting; he should appreciate the efforts made by his scholarly brethren to provide accurate results, or at least he should not throw spokes into their wheels. *** Students of this history of mathematics should try, like the students of other scientific subjects, to be as well acquainted as possible with the relevant literature. This requires patient and sustained efforts, but it is in the end more economical than the duplication of work already done or the utilization of writings already superseded, two wasteful procedures which are the penalties of bibliographic ignorance or negligence.
Nevertheless, the bibliography of a subject should be investigated with moderation and remain a means rather than an end. There are occasions when bibliographical research may be carried on more deeply, for example, when those investigations imply specific difficulties, as in the case of oriental manuscripts, but these exceptions should not become the rule. Bibliographical extravagance is a sin rather than a virtue, a real perversity; it is the fruit of pedantry, or if not, it must inevitably lead to it. Whenever the knowledge of a subject is sacrificed to a knowledge of its bibliography we may be sure that there is something wrong with the author, and his bibliographical results deserve less confidence than if he had devoted more time to the study of the subject itself and less to the bibliography of it. Indeed, such immoderate scholars give up precious realities for shadows; they make one think of the fools who to the delusive hope of wealth sacrifice all that makes life worth living.
It is relatively easy to compile enormous lists of titles concerning almost any subject, but such lists are more bewildering than useful if they are not accompanied with critical notes indicating the intrinsic value of each item. Such notes cannot be written by the mere bibliographer, but only by the genuine student of the subject, and the deeper and more original his study, the more reliable will be his appreciation of the work of other people. *** Bibliographical perversion is only an example of a larger category. When investigations become very technical, there is always a danger that the subject be sacrificed to the technique. The best way to minimize this danger is never to lose sight of the purpose of our studies. The purpose cannot be merely to exhibit one's mastery of a difficult technique, but rather to apply that technique to the attainment of a deeper understanding of mathematics and a better appreciation of the humanities implied.
The well tempered historian must beware equally of pedantry on the one hand and of inaccuracy or premature generalization on the other. He must ever bear in mind that, however desirable historical knowledge may be, its value, like that of any other kind of knowledge, is a function of its accuracy. Inaccurate knowledge, that is, knowledge which is below the level of attainable accuracy, is not only worthless; its value is negative.
There has been much discussion in recent years anent the double standard of morality applying to men and women. We are now beginning to realize that what is wrong and dishonorable for a woman is equally wrong and dishonorable for a man. There now remains to be overthrown another standard of morality which poisons our intellectual atmosphere. Accuracy has the same meaning in history as in science. The scientist who has two standards of truth, one for his scientific work, the other for his historical work, should not be allowed to discredit our studies but only himself. No matter what his 'scientific' reputation may be, as opposed to his 'historical' one, he should be revealed in his true colors, as an incompetent scholar, or a dishonest one, or both, as one who debases our knowledge and defiles his own temple.
The main duty of the historian of mathematics, as well as his fondest privilege, is to explain the humanity of mathematics, to illustrate its greatness, beauty, and dignity, and to describe how the incessant efforts and the accumulated genius of many generations have built up that magnificent monument, the object of our most legitimate pride as men, and of our wonder, humility, and thankfulness as individuals. The study of the history of mathematics will not make better mathematicians but gentler ones, it will enrich their minds, mellow their hearts, and bring out their finer qualities. 
